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How markets perform during famines has long been a
contentious issue. Recent research tends to
associate famine with market segmentation and
hoarding. The evidence of this paper, based on an
analysis of the spatial and temporal patterns of
price movements during four famines in pre-
industrial Europe, is that markets functioned
‘normally’ in times of crisis. -1-
ADAM SMITH AND AMARTYA SEN: 
MARKETS AND FAMINES IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL EUROPE
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[1] INTRODUCTION: 
How markets influence famines is a contentious issue. 
One tradition dating back beyond Adam Smith to the French
enlightenment holds that free markets minimize the damage done
by harvest failure. Another argues that, on the contrary, well
functioning markets may exacerbate famines, by removing food
from where there is insufficient purchasing power to richer,
less affected areas. A third holds that markets may not
function well during famines, for a variety of reasons. Grain
producers might tend to underestimate their prospects and hold
back supplies, resulting in intertemporal misallocation. In
that case false hopes of yet higher prices may generate
’bubbles’ in markets for staple foodstuffs. Or the problem
could be spatial, as when local or regional markets might
become balkanized because bad weather disrupts communications,
or because ’moral economy’ forces -- sanctioned, perhaps, by
policy measures -- intervene to prevent food shipments
dictated by market forces. Famine conditions producing ’noisy’
information about fundamentals could have the same effect. Or,
finally, the absence of competitive markets in normal times
might lead to profiteering by powerful middlemen such as flour
millers and moneylenders during famines (Drèze and Sen 1989:
22; 90-1; 143-4; 155;  Persson 1999: 41-2).-2-
In The Wealth of Nations Adam Smith made the classic case
for free trade in foodstuffs during what he called ’dearths’. 
All ’dearths’ or supply shortfalls in Europe for the previous
two centuries or more, he asserted, had been due to poor
harvests, and not to collusion between grain merchants, though
sometimes such shortages were exacerbated by warfare. Smith
also distinguished between ’dearths’ and ’famines’, claiming
that all European ’famines’ in the same period had been due to
’the violence of government attempting, by improper means, to
remedy the inconveniences of a dearth’. He believed that grain
merchants minimized such inconveniences by ensuring both
intertemporal and interregional arbitrage (Smith 1976: 526-
34).  The merchants’ optimal selling strategy would be to even
out consumption over the harvest year
2; those who hoarded
supplies too long would be forced to sell at a loss. The
smooth functioning of markets during famines also minimizes
deviations from an equilibrium price vector. Thus by
reallocating grain from areas in relative surplus to those in
relative deficit, the market mechanism is likely to produce a
net reduction in the damage done by any harvest failure (Drèze
and Sen 1989: 91).
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Smith’s preoccupation was with the influence of markets
in the event of a harvest shortfall.  That influence hinges on
the degree of market integration in normal times.  But in
backward, famine-prone economies facing high transport costs
and (perhaps) cumbersome controls on interregional trade, the-3-
scope for trade in non-famine years may be limited. This is a
reminder of another way in which markets can reduce the
probability and gravity of famines: market integration, by
ensuring that different regions pursue their comparative
advantage, increases steady-state aggregate output and
incomes, thereby reducing the damage done by any given
proportionate harvest shortfall. This mechanism is emphasised
in the work of French enlightenment writers (see Persson
1999), but Smith’s concern -- as in the historiography of
markets and famines generally -- was with the impact of
famines on the normal functioning of markets.  Smith’s claims
were ably re-articulated by Thomas Malthus (1800: 12-14) and
by Irish economist Mountifort Longfield (1834: 52-58).
However, the ability of merchants and markets to gauge supply
correctly in such circumstances has been questioned by others,
then and since (Young 1793: vol. 2, 401;  Rashid 1980: 497).
4 
The verdict of empirical analyses on market response
during famines is mixed. The official inquiry into the Great
Bengali Famine of 1942-3 argued that the rise in food prices
was ’more than the natural result of the shortage of supply
that had occurred’. Sen’s research on the same famine pointed
the finger at farmers and grain merchants for converting a
’moderate short-fall in production... into an exceptional
short-fall in market release’ (emphases in original). The
famine was due in large part to 'speculative withdrawal and
panic purchase of rice stocks... encouraged by administrative-4-
chaos’. Ravallion’s study of the 1974 Bangladesh famine also
blamed market failure, concluding that excess mortality was,
’in no small measure, the effect of a speculative crisis’.
Rice prices rose dramatically because merchants badly
underestimated a harvest which turned out to be normal. 
Prices then fell back just as fast. Ravallion also found
evidence of ’significant impediments’ to trade between the
capital city, Dhaka, and its main sources of supply during
this famine (Bhatia 1967: 323-4; Sen 1981: 76; Ravallion 1987:
19, 111-3; 1997: 1219-21; Becker and Quddus 2000). Famines in
Sudan and Ethiopia in the mid-1980s are also deemed to have
been exacerbated by weak spatial integration of markets. Price
explosions, price controls, and market disruptions were
’commonplace’, resulting in sharply rising marketing costs and
making price trends in sub-regions often dependent on
conditions in those same sub-regions alone (von Braun, Teklu,
and Webb 1999: ch. 6). However, formal studies of how markets
worked during pre-twentieth century famines are scarce.
[2] FOUR EUROPEAN FAMINES:
All four famines considered in this paper exacted large
death tolls. All were regionally uneven, and the proximate
cause in all cases was weather- or fungus-induced crop
failure. In all four cases the resultant output loss was
considerable, and was reflected in sharp increases in food-5-
prices. The first two famines occurred in France toward the
end of Louis XIV’s reign. France was then a formidable
military power, but its farming system struggled to feed its
huge, mainly rural, population of twenty two million. 
Agricultural output per worker in late seventeenth-century
France was less than it had been two centuries earlier, and
less than two-thirds of the levels attained in the Low
Countries or in England c. 1700 (Allen 2000). Both famines
were exacerbated by military campaigns on France’s borders and
further afield. In the first, excess mortality mounted in the
fall of 1693 and would remain high for much of 1694. The
estimated death toll of about 1.3 million people represented
six per cent of the population. The ’big winter’ of 1708-9 led
to the second famine considered here. It struck at a time of
grave economic crisis and ongoing warfare between France and
most of its neighbours. Mortality began to mount in mid-1709
and would reach 0.6 million before the end of 1710(Lachiver
1991: 361, 381-2).
The Great Finnish Famine of 1868, Europe’s last major
peace-time subsistence crisis, killed over 0.1 million in a
total population of 1.8 million. The historical context is
severe harvest failure in the wake of several years of
hardship in a poor and largely agrarian economy. Heavily
forested and dotted with large lakes, and with only about one-
twelfth of its land mass under cultivation, Finland was
sparsely populated. Internal communications, though improving,-6-
were poor, particularly in bad weather. There was an
increasing trade in grain between Saint Petersburg, Tallinn,
and Riga and coastal Finland, but away from coastal areas the
long-distance carriage of grain was on a small scale. On the
eve of the famine rye, the staple food of the poor, accounted
for well over one-half of grain production. The average yield
ratio was only four or five to one. In 1868 mortality was
highest in the central provinces of Vaasa and Kuopio and in
the remote northern province of Oulu.
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Finally, the Great Irish Famine (1846-52) was not just a
watershed in Irish history but also a major event in world
history, with far-reaching and enduring economic and political
consequences. It resulted in the deaths of about one million
people (Mokyr 1985). Whereas poor grain crops were the
proximate causes of the other famines, in Ireland the culprit
was the potato. The potato, in which Ireland had a comparative
advantage due to its damp climate, produced twice as much food
per acre as grain, but its low yield ratio and its
perishability were decided disadvantages (Bourke 1993; Rosen
1999). In 1845, phytophthera infestans, a plant disease new to
Europe, destroyed about one-third of the potato crop, and in
the following year destroyed most of it.
6 After a season’s
remission it also ruined the harvest of 1848. Excess mortality
would persist for two or three years more in some regions. 
The Irish famine thus lasted longer than the other three and,
relatively speaking, was the most devastating.-7-
[3]  AN ERROR-CORRECTION APPROACH:
The Law of One Price stipulates that prices will often
deviate from their equilibrium values, but properly
functioning markets will arbitrage away significant deviations
from equilibrium prices. Did markets in France in the 1690s,
in Ireland in the 1840s, or in Finland in the 1860s work as
posited by LOP? Here I use an error correction model (ECM)
approach to test whether the reaction to emerging
disequilibria was slower during a crisis than in normal times.
I estimate the following simple and familiar representation of
the error-correction model:
7 
)Pi,t = a + b)PA, t + cFAM1 + dPi, t-1 + ePA,t-1 + fFAM2 + gFAM3+ u’it  
where FAM1 = FAMDUM.)PA, t
FAM2 =FAMDUM.Pi, t-1
FAM3 = FAMDUM.PA,t-1
Here P is the log of price, A is Region A, and i is any other
region. Writing the model in this way offers the intuitive
interpretation that agents adjust to Pi,t from Pi,t-1 in response
to changes in PA (with b measuring the short-run effect).
Moreover, the model posits the long-run relation Pi = (e/d)PA.
Changes in Pi are caused by shocks to PA, and the extent to
which the system is out of equilibrium is represented by the
lagged error correction term. Since PA is expected to adjust-8-
upwards if Pi is higher in the previous period, we expect d<0.
The ratio (e/d) measures the equilibrium ratio between Pi and
PA; in the absence of transport and other transaction costs
d=e. 
The impact of the periods of severest harvest failure and
famine -- 1693-4 and July 1708 to June 1710 -- on the
adjustment process is captured by the coefficients on the
interaction terms FAM1, FAM2, and FAM3. c>0 would mean that
markets were better synchronized during the crisis, while f>0
and g<0 would imply slower adjustment than in normal times. 
The towns and cities included in the analysis of France
are Paris, Toulouse, Angoulême, Grenade-sur-Garonne, Pontoise,
Rozay-en-Brie, Albi, and Montbatzon. Four of these places were
significant towns at time: Paris (with a population of about
0.5 million), Toulouse (40,000), Angoulême (10,000), and Albi
(10,000). There would have been little or no trade in grain
between Toulouse and Paris in this period. Similarly for
Toulouse and Angoulême, though they were linked by navigable
river and coastwise via the major port city of Bordeaux. Three
of the other pairs -- Paris-Pontoise, Paris-Rozay, and
Toulouse-Grenade -- refer to markets within short distances of
each other. Pontoise, a town of a few thousand people, was one
of the main grain markets in the Paris basin, while Grenade
was only a short distance down-river from Toulouse. Rozay-en-
Brie, in the heart of one of France’s main grain-producing
regions, also supplied the Paris market. Montbatzon was a-9-
small market town near Tours. The choice of towns was
constrained by the need for monthly wheat price data.
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The model yields the results described in Table 1. They
confirm textbook priors about these markets in normal years.
First, the b’s are all positive, ranging from 0.204 for
Montbatzon-Paris in 1680-1699 to 0.843 for Grenade-Toulouse in
1700-1712, and the d’s are all negative, ranging from -0.043
for Angoulême-Toulouse in 1680-1719 to -0.649 for Grenade-
Toulouse in 1680-1699. Moreover, the spread of coefficient
values is consistent with distance and communications. The
closer the markets to each other the stronger the co-movements
and the bigger the adjustments to disequilibria. Moreover, the
values of d/e, representing the equilibrium price ratios
between PA and Pi, are broadly plausible: prices were highest
in the receiving areas. Thirdly, the c’s are mostly positive
and in some cases emphatically so, and none of the negative
c’s is statistically significant. Evidence of stronger co-
movements during the famine months may reflect the power of
the famine ’signal’ relative to the background noise. Eleven
of the fourteen f’s in Table 1 are negative, indicating faster
adjustment in crisis months. The values are weakly determined
for the most part, however (as are the g’s), which suggests
that responses varied little between normal and crisis years.
Finally, dividing the forty-year period into two suggests that
the reaction of wheat prices in 1709-10 was stronger than in
1693-4.-10-
Table 2 reports the results of estimating the adjustments
to price movements in Paris between 1680 and 1698 as a system
of seemingly unrelated regressions (SURE). The standard
Breusch-Pagan test emphatically rejects independence (P
2(15) =
217.7), but the outcome is basically as in Table 1 except that
the coefficients are nearly always better determined. In sum,
these French data imply markets that were better integrated
than indicated by the historiography, and fail to support the
hypothesis that markets for grain performed ’worse’ during the
two famines than in normal times.
[TABLES 1-3 ABOUT HERE]
Our Finnish data refer to rye, then by far the most
important of Finland’s grain crops, from October 1858 to
December 1873. In Table 3 describes the in seven of Finland’s
eight provinces to price movements in the province Viipuri,
using both single equation and SURE estimation. Viipuri was
chosen as a likely market leader because it was coastal and
located next to Russian markets, and therefore most likely to
be the channels for outside market influences. Again separate
estimation and SURE yield similar outcomes, though the
Breusch-Pagan test rejects independence even more emphatically
(P
2(21) = 613.3) than in the French case, and estimation is
consequently more efficient. As in France nearly two centuries
earlier, prices were more synchronized during the famine than-11-
in other periods. The case for slower response during the
famine is rejected by the generally small and weakly
determined values of f and g.
9
Finally, though the Irish famine was due to the failure
of the potato, the behaviour of grain markets is nevertheless
of interest. Indian meal (or maize) and oatmeal were the
closest substitutes for the potato. Contemporary critics
accused grain merchants of taking undue advantage of the
situation and of making enormous profits through over-
charging. Data on grain and oatmeal prices in Ireland are
plentiful. Estimating a variant of the ECM described above
with weekly oats prices between early June 1846 and the end of
1847 suggested strong co-movements and quick adjustment to
disequilibria. Comparing the cities of Cork and Dublin, for
example, implied that over half the response to a change in
the Dublin price occurred within two weeks. Comparing
movements in the price of oats in Dublin and Cork with those
in London over a longer period also implied the rapid erosion
of disequilibrium gaps (Ó Gráda 1999: 141-3).
Considering the evidence of this section as a whole, the
outcome is broadly supportive of well-integrated markets both
in normal and famine times. Co-movements between pairs of
markets continued to be strong in crisis years, and in general
the speed of adjustment was as fast.-12-
[4]  A SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE:
The Law of One Price states that in a well-integrated
market persistent price differences between regions stem
largely from transport costs. Let T  be a vector of the
(constant) costs of shipping grain from a region to the most
expensive region, and PN and PF be vectors of normal and famine
grain prices, respectively. Then the Law of One Price implies
that in equilibrium the standard deviation of prices across
regions, F, will reflect T. Normally PF will exceed PN: this
was certainly so in all cases considered here. Thus, unless T
changes, with well-functioning markets arbitrage will produce
F(PF) # F(PN).  Alternatively, the coefficient of variation in
prices (CV) should fall during famines (for a simple example
see Ó Gráda 1997). Note, however, that the bad weather
sometimes associated with famine conditions might increase T,
as would the disruption of trade by legislation or ’moral
economy’ forces.
The contrasting outcomes in the maize markets of Botswana
and Kenya in years of crisis in the early 1980s (see Drèze and
Sen 1989: 144, 155) are of interest here. In Botswana, where
the average price of maize meal rose from 3.53 to 4.74 pula
per bag between August 1980 and April 1983, the coefficient of
variation across eighteen markets fell from 0.07 to 0.05. In
Kenya, however, where the average retail price of maize rose
from 2.42 to 4.61 Kenyan shillings per kilo between January
and November 1984, the coefficient of variation across-13-
eighteen markets trebled from 0.15  to 0.45.
Regional price data are available for all four famines
described here. First I use annual data on a broad cross-
section of French towns and cities
10 for insight into whether
grain markets became more or less segmented during the famines
of 1693-4 and 1709-10. Note first that even in normal times
the coefficients of variation were very high.
11 A disruption of
normal patterns in times of crisis is suggested by the impact
on the correlation between wheat prices in the forty towns in
year t and year t+1. Over the period 1671-1750 the average
year-to-year correlation was +0.797, with a standard deviation
of 0.152. However, the correlation plummeted from +0.770 in
1692-3 to +0.322 in 1693-4 and +0.392 in 1694-5 before
recovering to +0.722 in 1695-6. Again it dropped from +0.950
in 1706-7 to +0.271 and +0.233 in the following two years,
rising to +0.599 again in 1709-10.
The coefficients of variation of wheat prices rose both
in 1694 and 1695, and in 1709 and 1710 (and also in the wake
of another serious harvest failure in 1740). While some of the
rises in 1709 and 1740 might be attributed to the impact of
bad weather on shipping costs, those in other years cannot be
so readily accounted for. Note that the implied disruption of
markets was somewhat greater during the famine of 1709-10 than
in 1693-4, and proportionately greatest in 1740.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]-14-
I turn next to potato prices in Ireland in the 1840s. 
Most potatoes grown in Ireland before the famine were for
domestic or local consumption. One of the potato’s
disadvantages is that it was relatively costly to transport;
Hoffman and Mokyr (1984) reckon that one-fourth of the
potato’s value ’evaporated’ with every ten miles it travelled. 
Nevertheless, there was an active local trade in potatoes in
Ireland before the famine, and most towns had their potato
markets.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Table 4 reports evidence from two sets of regional
prices. Panel A summarises data contained in a parliamentary
report on potato prices in almost four hundred Irish towns
between 1840 and 1846. The numbers are not ideal for our
purpose, because they extend only as far as the harvest of
1845, the first to be affected by blight. Moreover because
they refer to the highest prices paid, they may well reflect a
range of qualities and varieties across the country. In
mitigation they refer to the prices paid in a single week in
January, so they have the advantage of controlling for
seasonal variation. In general, the observed interregional
price gaps are smaller than what transport costs would
indicate. This suggests that trade in potato substitutes such
as grain helped to arbitrage away disequilibrium differences. -15-
Panel B refers to a different, smaller sample of towns. It
includes 1848, when the ravages of blight were particularly
severe. The standard deviations in the two panels are not
strictly comparable. Note, however, that while F  was higher
in 1846 than in any of the preceding years, in 1848 it was
lower than in the years immediately following. Though the
outcome contains no strong message for how the market (or
markets) for potatoes worked during the famine, it seems more
consistent with orderly than segmented markets in the wake of
the blight.
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Two features of the Finnish data in Table 5 are apparent:
the very low coefficients of variation throughout, and the
rise in the standard deviation in the famine yeras of 1867-8.  
In Finland both before and after the famine of 1867-8 grain
prices were normally highest in the northern provinces of Oulu
and Kuopio, with the mean price of rye in Oulu being on
average 10-15 per cent higher than that in Vaasa or Häme. 
However, during the famine years the proportionate price rises
were greatest in the southwest, with the result that levels in
Uusimaa, Turku and Häme provinces were exceeded only by those
in Oulu. The severe harvest shortfalls in the southwest in
1867-8 (Kaukiainen 1984) may account for the increases, and
the poverty of Kuopio and Oulu for the failure of prices in
those provinces to rise in tandem. Put another way, in Kuopio
and Oulu an ’entitlements’ failure may have compounded the
problem caused by poor harvests. However, the widening gap-16-
between prices in the southwest and in Viipuri (Viborg) in
1867-8 leaves unresolved the question why more grain did not
flow west from Viipuri during the famine.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
The 1870-3 data in Table 5 show the earlier pattern re-
establishing itself again in the wake of the famine. This
suggests that in normal times small interprovincial movements
in grain seem to have been enough to maintain the pattern
observed before and after 1867-8. At the height of the crisis,
however, we can only speculate that interprovincial trade or
imports from outside Finland were insufficient to maintain the
kind of equilibrium price vector assumed in our model. Indeed
some interprovincial flows may have been reversed. The lack of
data on internal trade and the cost of transport preclude firm
conclusions on this score.
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In sum there is evidence from these famines of rises in
the regional variation in prices at the height of the crisis
than in immediately preceding or succeeding years. The rises
were modest, however: the fivefold rise in the standard
deviation of prices across Kenya during 1984 offers some
perspective.-17-
[5]  SEASONALITY AND STORAGE:
Adam Smith believed that corn merchants were best placed
’to divide the inconveniencies of [a scarcity] as equally as
possible through all the different months, and weeks, and days
of the year’ (Smith, 1976: 533-4). The findings of Sen (1981)
and Ravallion (1987) suggest that, on the contrary,
speculative hoarding can exacerbate famine situations.  Hard
historical evidence on storage is scarce: records of the
Chartier farm, a large-scale family-run enterprise at Choisy
near Paris (Moriceau and Postel-Vinay 1992: 225-226), offer
one useful illustration. In normal years such a farm would be
expected to combine with grain merchants to produce something
akin to consumption smoothing over the season. In the case at
hand this meant small off-farm disposals between July and
November. Figure 2 compares monthly off-farm corn sales in
normal harvest-years and in 1693-4, and shows the Chartiers
disposing of more of their corn in the early months of the
famine harvest-year than in normal seasons. This is hardly
consistent with hoarding. Alas, one Chartier swallow does not
make a summer, and farm records as rich as theirs are the
exception.
Here I build on an insight associated with McCloskey and
Nash (1984) but traceable back to Samuelson (1957) in order to
shed further light on the role of hoarding during the famines
analysed here.  McCloskey and Nash sought to infer storage-18-
costs and interest rates in medieval and early modern Europe
from the seasonality patterns observed in grain prices. Their
argument followed from the simple premise that those merchants
and farmers who store grain must in equilibrium be rewarded
for the opportunity cost of tied-up funds and losses from
wastage during the storage period. A saw-tooth price
seasonality pattern is indicated, with low prices in the wake
of the harvest giving way gradually to a maximum before the
new harvest comes in. The more important are fixed costs such
as storage facilities and security, the less sensitive
seasonal increases be to the quality of the harvest.
Abstracting from other complications, this means that in a
well-functioning market seasonality would at most produce the
same proportionate increases in prices in bad years as in
good.  Then lower-than-normal seasonal price rises during the
crisis might indicate that producers were holding on to stocks
in hopes of much higher prices at the end of the season. If,
on the other hand, the seasonal price rise was faster than
usual, this could reflect either the desperation of consumers
or the fears of producers that their food stocks might
deteriorate (see below) or be requisitioned. Hoarding during
famines, in other words, implies smaller increases than usual
from seasonal trough to peak.
In reality this presumption is complicated by the
presence of carry-over stocks of grain from one harvest to the
next, and in practice there is considerable variation or-19-
’noise’ in the month-to-month and seasonal movements (see e.g.
Persson 1999). In Table 6 I compare the average rises in wheat
prices between September in year t (at the beginning of the
harvest year) and June in year t+1 (before prices are affected
by the next harvest) in eight French towns between the 1680s
and the 1710s. The outcome shows only weak traces of the
seasonality pattern noted by McCloskey and Nash. On average
prices rose a little over the season, but they were subject to
huge year-to-year variation. However, in the famine years of
1693-4 and 1708-9 the rises greatly exceeded the average, in
1708-9 soaring two or more standard deviations above it. The
particularly sharp seasonal price rises during our two famines
do not support the view that farmers or others hoarded early
in the season in hopes that price would rise later.
Table 7 compares the average rises in rye and barley
prices in Finland between September in year t and June in year
t+1 in ’normal’ years (1859-66 and 1869-73) and in the famine
year of 1867-8 in rural districts in the provinces of Oulu,
Uusimaa, Vaasa, Kuopio, and Mikkeli. The outcome shows the
seasonality pattern noted by McCloskey and Nash. In the
average ’normal’ year both rye and barley prices were about
ten per cent higher in June than in the previous September,
but the rise was subject to considerable year-to-year
variation. Nevertheless, the rises during the famine year of
1867-8 were exceptional: double to treble the average, and
double to four times the standard deviation of price rises in-20-
other, non-famine years. These sharp increases do not rule out
the possibility that farmers or others hoarded early in the
season in hopes that price would rise later, but surely they
make it less likely.
Potatoes seem an ideal crop for this kind of simple
framework, since there was no carry-over from one year to the
next. Indeed, before the Irish Famine the prices of different
potato varieties before the crisis were subject to marked
seasonality. Moreover, the seasonal rise in prices was greater
during the crisis than in normal times. While this does not
rule out speculation or hoarding on the part of potato
suppliers, it certainly argues in that direction. In these
data actions speak louder than intentions, but it seems clear
that some traders sold quickly for fear that their supplies
would not keep (Ó Gráda 1993: 116-21; 2000).
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[6] CONCLUSION:
We began our discussion with Adam Smith’s assertion that
in the two centuries prior to 1776 no famine had arisen ’[in]
any part of Europe... but for the violence of government
attempting, by improper means, to remedy the inconveniences of
a dearth’ (Smith 1976: 526). The French famines of 1693-4 and
1709-10 represented two more cases where, as in Ireland in the
1840s and Finland in the 1860s, the catastrophic nature of
harvest failures overwhelmed functioning markets. If the state-21-
was to blame, it was for inadequate entitlement transfers from
rich to poor, not for undue meddling with food markets. It is
curious how Smith, for all his allegedly wide reading, ignored
the major French famines of 1693-4 and 1709-10, though he
noted (1976: 526) that he had ’pretty exact accounts’ of
several dearths and famines. Whether a better understanding of
the history of European famines would have caused him to
modify his position must remain a moot point.
During these famines, markets worked more smoothly than
might have been expected on the basis of a reading of
qualitative and fictional accounts. Though a spatial
perspective on grain prices produced some evidence of slightly
greater segmentation of markets during the famine, an error
correction approach to regional price movements showed that in
all cases the short-run effect captured by the co-movement of
grain prices was more powerful during the famine than in other
times. It also yielded evidence in most cases of a quicker-
than-normal response to emerging disequilibria.   Moreover,
the data failed to support the claim that hoarding was more
common during the famine than in normal years.
Taken together, our results do not rule out a further
role for markets in exacerbating these crises: a fall in
purchasing power in the worst-affected regions could have
aggravated one or more of them because markets were so well
integrated. That is an issue worth exploring further. Nor have
we addressed the issue why market responses in pre-industrial-22-
Europe differed so much to those found in southern Asia or in
Africa in the twentieth century. Still, it would seem that a
backward agriculture, coupled with the lack of an adequate
policy response from the authorities, rather than the failure
of the markets for staple foodstuffs to work, were mainly
responsible for the famines analysed here.-23-
________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 1: PAIRWISE ERROR CORRECTION MODEL ESTIMATES
Coefficients Ang-Toul Gren-Toul Batz-Toul Pont-Paris  Batz-Paris
a  0.024 -0.136**  0.017 -0.065   0.004
b  0.281**  0.829**  0.251**  0.545**   0.204**
c  0.031 -0.005  0.282**  0.096   0.288**
d -0.043** -0.576** -0.109** -0.190**  -0.227**
e  0.028  0.622**  0.094**  0.211**   0.179**
f -0.141** -0.227 -0.114 -0.388**  -0.060
g  0.151**  0.232  0.132**  0.386**   0.053
N  396  396  396    226   226
F  13.04 119.36  15.81  26.77   9.26
Coefficients Ang-Toul Ang-Toul Gren-Toul Gren-Toul  Alb-Toul
a -0.001 -0.040 -0.140 -0.201**   0.002
b  0.232**  0.377**  0.839**  0.843**   0.402**
c -0.420  0.123 -0.110  0.157  -0.082
d -0.037* -0.123** -0.649** -0.553**  -0.274**
e  0.039  0.130**  0.694**  0.628**   0.283**
f -0.043** -0.202** -0.255  0.224   0.023
g  0.044**  0.212**  0.263 -0.221  -0.008
N  240  156  240  156   197
F  3.56  119.36  74.12  48.06   8.38
Coefficients Batz-Toul Batz-Toul Batz-Ang Batz-Ang
a  0.051 -0.165**  0.129** -0.062
b  0.232**  0.304**  0.226**  0.405**
c  0.392**  0.124 -0.113  0.066
d -0.115** -0.189** -0.226** -0.188**
e  0.087**  0.243**  0.141**  0.207**
f -0.260 -0.086  0.118 -0.339**
g  0.278  0.100 -0.086  0.352**
N  240    156  240  156
F  7.36  11.87  7.33  16.36
  Key: Ang=Angoulême; Batz=Montbatzon; Par=Paris;
Pont=Pontoise; Gren=Grenade; Toul=Toulouse; Alb=Albi
(**) significant at 1% level; (*) significant at 5% level




TABLE 2 COMPARING SURE AND SEPARATE ESTIMATION RESULTS:
 FRANCE(1680-1698)
SURE Estimation (ML) Separate Estimation (OLS)
------------------------------------------------------------------
         |    Coef.     z     Coef.         t    
---------+--------------------------------------------------------
Angoulême
    a    |  -0.076     -1.65  0.062 -1.32
    b    |   0.129      1.82  0.120  1.65
    c    |  -0.067     -0.61 -0.058 -0.52
    d    |  -0.091     -3.89 -0.072 -2.90
    e    |   0.114      3.34  0.091  2.55
    f    |   0.060      0.84  0.033  0.43
    g    |  -0.061     -1.02 -0.036 -0.57
---------+--------------------------------------------------------
Grenade  
    a    |   0.017      0.35    -0.006 -0.12
    b    |   0.055      0.68  0.039  0.49
    c    |   0.464      3.68   0.477  3.78
    d    |  -0.134     -5.49  -0.072 -2.74
    e    |   0.099      3.69     0.061  2.21
    f    |  -0.250     -2.33  -0.200 -1.66
    g    |   0.200      2.35   0.158  1.66
---------+--------------------------------------------------------
Toulouse 
    a    |   0.069      1.37  0.033  0.64
    b    |   0.036      0.44  0.019  0.23
    c    |   0.436      3.35  0.422  3.20
    d    |  -0.130     -5.05 -0.075 -2.71
    e    |   0.078      2.93  0.049  1.81
    f    |  -0.232     -2.06 -0.159 -1.25
    g    |   0.188      2.08  0.127  1.24
---------+--------------------------------------------------------
Montbatzon
    a    |   0.004      0.09  0.004  0.08
    b    |   0.203      2.49  0.204  2.47
    c    |   0.306      2.33  0.288  2.15
    d    |  -0.218     -5.56 -0.227 -5.43
    e    |   0.171      4.59  0.179  4.57
    f    |  -0.158     -0.93 -0.060 -0.33
    g    |   0.132      0.96  0.053  0.37
---------+--------------------------------------------------------
Pontoise 
    a    |  -0.067     -1.57 -0.065 -1.51
    b    |   0.554      7.64  0.546  7.39
    c    |   0.091      0.81  0.096  0.84
    d    |  -0.210     -4.87 -0.190 -4.06
    e    |   0.231      4.93  0.211  4.20
    f    |  -0.342     -2.82 -0.388 -3.00




Rozay       
    a    |  -0.093     -2.16 -0.122 -2.73
    b    |   0.466      8.06  0.491  8.28
    c    |  -0.503     -0.59 -0.072 -0.83
    d    |  -0.130     -2.75 -0.178 -3.48
    e    |   0.157      2.75  0.211  3.47
    f    |  -0.301     -4.01 -0.263 -3.30
    g    |   0.290      4.05  0.254  3.34
---------+--------------------------------------------------------
Correlation matrix of residuals in SURE estimation:
        dgren   dbatz   dtoul   dpont    dang    droz
dgren  1.0000
dbatz  0.2544  1.0000
dtoul  0.6939  0.2315  1.0000
dpont  0.0639  0.1631  0.1038  1.0000
 dang  0.2698  0.1598  0.2761  0.0933  1.0000
 droz  0.0745  0.1571  0.0638  0.3163  0.0198  1.0000
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(15) =   217.732, Pr = 0.0000-26-
______________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 3: ECM ESTIMATES FOR FINNISH PROVINCES (1858-1873)
SURE Estimation (ML) Separate Estimation (OLS)
------------------------------------------------------------------
         |     Coef.      z        Coef.       t
---------+--------------------------------------------------------
Oulu     
   a     |  -0.394     -3.07  0.302 -2.20
   b     |   0.423      4.07  0.409  3.86
   c     |   0.667      2.93  0.654  2.83
   d     |  -0.005     -3.78 -0.004 -2.62
   e     |   0.168      3.51  0.130  2.49
   f     |  -0.004     -2.40 -0.004 -1.67
   g     |   0.043      2.37  0.034  1.64
---------+--------------------------------------------------------
Vaasa    
   a     |   0.019      0.26  0.014 -0.19
   b     |   0.318      4.35  0.315  4.27
   c     |   0.420      2.55  0.345  2.05
   d     |  -0.106     -5.11 -0.070 -2.74
   e     |   0.101      3.26  0.075  2.15
   f     |   0.089      1.22   0.207  2.24
   g     |  -0.092     -1.23 -0.214  2.26
---------+--------------------------------------------------------
Mikkeli  
   a     |  -0.804     -4.46 -0.886 -4.52
   b     |   0.447      4.21  0.455  4.19
   c     |   0.630      2.65  0.619  2.54
   d     |  -0.009     -5.08 -0.010 -5.05
   e     |   0.325      4.75  0.359  4.78
   f     |  -0.000     -0.19 -0.000 -0.13
   g     |   0.004      0.18  0.002  0.12
---------+--------------------------------------------------------
Uusimaa  
   a     |  -0.016     -0.23   0.018  0.25
   b     |   0.435      5.81  0.377  4.89
   c     |   0.463      2.88   0.502  3.07
   d     |  -0.234     -6.11  -0.124 -2.50
   e     |   0.239      5.07  0.118  2.02
   f     |  -0.287     -2.29  -0.350 -2.17
   g     |   0.302      2.35   0.364  2.20
---------+--------------------------------------------------------
Kuopio   
   a     |   0.002      0.02  0.007  0.09
   b     |   0.406      4.92  0.397  4.71
   c     |   1.067      5.93  1.072  5.84
   d     |  -0.208     -5.21 -0.184 -3.93
   e     |   0.210      4.64   0.185  3.60
   f     |   0.009      0.10  0.035  0.34




Turku    
   a     |   0.117      1.47  0.104  1.30
   b     |   0.336      4.04  0.329  3.91
   c     |   0.377      1.92  0.204  0.98
   d     |  -0.179     -6.07 -0.142 -3.55
   e     |   0.142      3.67  0.109  2.30
   f     |   0.121      1.79  0.239  2.60
   g     |  -0.118     -1.69 -0.242 -2.56
---------+--------------------------------------------------------
Häme     |
   a     |  -0.096     -0.68  0.000  0.00
   b     |   0.602      4.08  0.524  3.47
   c     |   0.851      2.62  0.792  2.38
   d     |  -0.303     -7.44 -0.209 -3.88
   e     |   0.331      5.00  0.208  2.62
   f     |  -0.188     -1.39 -0.077 -0.44
   g     |   0.195      1.42  0.082  0.46
------------------------------------------------------------------
Correlation matrix of residuals from SURE estimation:
         doul   dvaas    dmik    duus   dkuop   dturk   dhame
 doul  1.0000
dvaas  0.4338  1.0000
 dmik  0.1987  0.3399  1.0000
 duus  0.3556  0.4321  0.3545  1.0000
dkuop  0.4109  0.3876  0.2929  0.3183  1.0000
dturk  0.2724  0.5565  0.2863  0.5512  0.4061  1.0000
dhame  0.2122  0.4370  0.2530  0.5977  0.2448  0.6556  1.0000




TABLE 4:  MEAN MONTHLY PRICE OF RYE BY PROVINCE (FINNISH MARKS)
Province 1859-64 1867-68    1870-73
Uusimaa 24.64 32.52 22.31
Turku 24.46 33.84 23.33
Häme 24.00 32.49 22.25
Mikkeli 24.34 30.52 25.17
Viipuri 24.97 29.02 23.42
Kuopio 26.74 30.76 25.03
Vaasa 24.30 30.73 22.10
Oulu 27.64 33.42 25.98
Mean 25.14 31.66 23.70
F 1.236 1.548 1.408
CV 0.049 0.049 0.059
Source: Ó Gráda (2001)
_______________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
FIGURE 1: THE COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION IN GRAIN 
PRICES IN FRANCE 1690-9, 1705-14, AND 1735-44
Year      CV Year      CV Year     CV
1690    0.291 1705    0.336 1735    0.280
1691    0.309 1706    0.401 1736    0.288
1692    0.335 1707    0.370 1737    0.258
1693    0.345 1708    0.397 1738    0.181
1694    0.424 1709    0.469 1739    0.168
1695    0.485 1710    0.470 1740    0.401
1696    0.278 1711    0.279 1741    0.292
1697    0.317 1712    0.238 1742    0.312
1688    0.261 1713    0.186 1743    0.354
1699    0.231 1714    0.282 1744    0.371
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 Table 5: THE REGIONAL VARIATION OF POTATO PRICES IN THE 1840s
   A. MARKET TOWN DATA 1840-1846:
   1840     1841     1842     1843     1844     1845     1846
Mean price per st. (pence)  2.83     2.70     2.78     2.38     2.49     2.65     3.94
F    0.97     0.82     0.89     0.84     0.79     0.76     1.16
CV    0.34   0.31  0.32 0.35     0.32     0.28   0.29
   B. TOWN PRICE DATA, 1848-1851:
   1848   1849  1850  1851
Mean price per cwt. (pence)   58.06  49.55 42.37 43.38
 F     7.04   9.12  8.40  7.09
 CV    0.12   0.18  0.20  0.16
 Note: sources for these data are given in Ó Gráda, 1999
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TABLE 6: THE SEASONAL  RISE IN  WHEAT PRICES 1680-1719: MONTHLY DATA
    Paris(*)    Angoulême   Rozay     Toulouse   M’batzon(#)   Pontoise   Grenade
Mean Increase (%)        0.9 10.8  2.4        7.3       13.7       7.6  12.2
Standard deviation        28.1 35.9      49.0     28.8       49.2     47.4  31.1
 
Increase in 1692-3 (%)  80.4 27.0      44.7       37.0   22.5      84.6      39.1
Increase in 1693-4 (%)  21.5 29.8      40.4     53.1   50.0      40.0  61.8
Increase 1708-9 (%)      --     171.8     256.5 108.9  248.1 242.7 112.5
(*) 1680-98;    (#) 1680-1715, 1698/9 missing
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  TABLE 7: THE SEPT.-JUNE RISE IN RYE AND BARLEY PRICES IN FINLAND
[1] Rye: Oulu     Uusimaa    Vaasa      Kuopio    Mikkeli
Mean Increase (%) [*]  9.6       8.1       11.3       12.2 13.8
Standard deviation [*] 13.0       9.2        8.3       11.9     13.1
Increase in 1867-8 (%) 22.9 31.5 29.0   38.1 43.7
[2] Barley
Mean Increase (%) [*] 14.6       7.2       15.1 12.2 13.0
Standard deviation [*] 14.4       7.0       10.9 10.0  7.3
Increase in 1867-8 (%) 40.9 30.4 56.4 38.1 39.9
[*]  Excluding 1867-8
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
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    FIGURE 2: SALES OF WHEAT AT CHOISY-AUX-BOEUFS IN THE 1690s
Monthly Sales VIII    IX     X    XI    XII     I    II    III     IV    V     VI    VII
(percent) 
Normal Years 1.8    1.9    1.4   6.4   8.4    8.8   11.6   11.1    8.7    11.9   17.4  10.6
1693-4 11.4   12.3   8.0   8.8   6.0   12.6    8.5    8.8    7.3     7.1    9.2    0.0
Source: Moriceau and Postel-Vinay, 1992: 226
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1.  Part of the underlying research was made possible by the
award of a Presidential Fellowship at University College
Dublin.  Thanks to Kevin Denny, Karl-Gunnar Persson, Jean-
Michel Chevet, Michael Moore, Joel Mokyr, Kari Pitkänen, Kevin
O’Rourke, and Jeff Williamson for helpful comments on earlier
versions.
2.  Well, not quite, since the cost of storage implies a gradual
reduction in consumption over the harvest-year. 
3.  See too François Quesnay’s remark in his article on corn in
the Encyclopédie: ’le prétexte de rémédier aux famines dans un
royaume, en interceptant le commerce des grains entre les
provinces, donne encore lieu à des abus qui augmentent la
misère, qui détruisent l’agriculture, et qui anéantissent les
revenus du royaume’ (in Quesnay, 1958: 494n.) 
4.  Young did not blame grain merchants, however.  In Travels in
France he stressed their part in minimizing the danger of
famine, and denounced the anti-speculator sentiment of the
cahiers de doléance. In The Question of Scarcity Plainly
Stated, prompted by the near-famine of 1800, he argued that
the harvest shortfall was ’great and real [and] a very high
price a necessary consequence’, against critics who blamed
artificial manipulation by hoarders and speculators.  But
Young did not fully trust merchants’ judgement of the size of
the harvest, and as secretary of the Board of Agriculture
urged the necessity of a national agricultural census (Young,
1793: ch. 18; Rashid, 1980: 499; Gazley, 1973: 416-7).
5. For background see Kaukiainen 1984; Kiiskinen 1961; Lefgren
1973. 
6.  Fogel (1992) has characterized famines in early modern
Europe as due to anticipated rather than true harvest
ENDNOTES:-38-
failures.  The famines analysed here do not fit such a
pattern.  In Finland ’the harvest of 1867 failed seriously:
what was left amounted to about half the normal crop’
(Kaukiainen, 1984: 241), while the admittedly limited
quantitative data available on France in 1693 and 1708
suggests that the harvests of those years were also severely
affected (Lachiver, 1991: 118, 308-9).
7.  Alogoskoufis and Smith (1995) is a good introduction to ECM.
 Before estimating an ECM the individual price series had to
be tested for stationarity.  The series used here are
differences in the logs of prices in the markets mentioned
above, and the gaps between the logs of price pairs.  In all
cases the hypothesis that the individual series had a unit
root could be firmly rejected.  
8.  The data (for which I am grateful to David Weir and Jean-
Michel Chevet) refer to market or mercuriale prices. Gaps were
very few and these were plugged by simple interpolation.
9. Elsewhere (Ó Gráda 2001) I examine the outcome of treating
Vaasa as market leader and the reaction of prices in the
remote northern province of Oulu to movements in the other
seven provinces. The outcome corroborates the results reported
in Table 3.
10.  The underlying data base, which was kindly supplied by
David Weir of the University of Michigan, refers to forty
towns and cities.  For details see Ó Gráda, 2001b.
11.  Across the eight statistical provinces that would
constitute the Kingdom of Prussia in 1871  coefficient of
variation of wheat prices averaged 0.074 over the 1841-70
period and that of rye prices 0.117 (estimated from
Zeitschrift, 1871).  
12. Far greater segmentation between regional markets for
potatoes in bad years is suggested by early nineteenth century-39-
German data.  Across Prussia’s eight statistical regions the
coefficient of variation of potato prices during the famine
years of 1816-17 was double the 1818-27 average (estimated
from Zeitschrift, 1871).  
13.  An alternative scenario is also plausible (compare Ejrnaes
and Persson, 2000).  The inter-provincial differences in grain
prices before 1867 seem to have been much smaller than those
suggested by transport costs.  Perhaps this was because in
normal years other goods and labour were less expensive to
move than grain, and substituted for grain shipments between
the provinces.  If so, a crisis-induced increase in grain
shipments between regions might well have have increased the
spatial variation in prices. 
14.   Cork city, newspaper reports refer to the quantities of
potatoes traded on six city markets between 1842 and 1848.  On
the eve of the famine, the outcome reveals a market which
spread sales well over a harvest season beginning in early
autumn.  Comparing the pattern in 1845-6 with that in 1842-43,
1843-44, and 1844-45 indicates that the proportion of sales
early in the season was higher than before.  In 1846-7 again
sales were proportionately higher early in the season.  This
outcome is consistent with that indicated by the seasonal
pattern in prices (Ó Gráda, 1999: 147-9).
 